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Use of apps in the COVID-19 response and the 
loss of privacy protection
Mobile apps provide a convenient source of tracking and data collection to fight against the spread of COVID-19. 
We report our analysis of 50 COVID-19-related apps, including their use and their access to personally identifiable 
information, to ensure that the right to privacy and civil liberties are protected.
Tanusree Sharma and Masooda Bashir
Compared with prior infectious-disease outbreaks (e.g., the ‘Spanish flu’ pandemic of 1918 and the ‘Asian 
flu’ pandemic of 1957), the COVID-19 
emergency is occurring in a vastly more 
connected and digital world. Governments 
in multiple countries are pushing for 
location surveillance to contain the spread 
of COVID-191. Digital surveillance may be 
the most effective way to contain the spread 
of the outbreak, but how privacy rights 
may be impacted must be considered both 
now and as this crisis moves forward. Fear 
and uncertainty often win out over civil 
liberties; however, as has been learned from 
past crises, such as the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001, it can be hard to regain 
lost liberties2. Thus, it is critical not only 
that virus-response opportunities provided 
by technology be embraced but also that 
technology be used to ensure that the right 
to privacy is secured (Fig. 1).
Some countries, such as China, Israel, 
Singapore and South Korea, have launched 
tracking apps to fight the pandemic, 
and many more commercial apps have 
been released since the beginning of 
the outbreak. Here we examine 50 apps 
available in the Google Play Store that have 
been developed specifically for COVID-19 
(Supplementary Table 1).
The most common functionalities of the 
apps are as follows: live maps and updates of 
confirmed cases; real-time location-based 
alerts; systems for monitoring and 
controlling home isolation and quarantine, 
direct reporting to government, and 
self-reporting of symptoms; and education 
about COVID-19. Some more-advanced 
services include self-assessment of daily 
physiological status; monitoring of vital 
parameters, such as temperature, heart rate, 
oxygen and blood pressure, through the 
use of Bluetooth-enabled medical devices; 
virtual medical consultations (ADiLife 
Covid-19 in Italy); social science–based 
interventions based on predictive analysis of 
diseases in specific locations (OpenWHO); 
and community-driven contact tracing 
(TraceTogether and mfineRadar).
We found that 30 of the 50 apps require 
permission for numerous types of access to 
users’ mobile devices. For example, some 
demand access to contacts, photos, media, 
files, location data, the camera, the device 
ID, call information, the WiFi connection, 
the microphone, full network access, the 
Google service configuration, and the ability 
to change network connectivity and audio 
settings, to name just a few types of access. 
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Fig. 1 | Data dashboards of COVID-19 apps. The distribution of COVID-19 apps (data collected from Google Play Store).
Nature MeDICINe | www.nature.com/naturemedicine
comment
In addition, some apps explicitly state that 
they will collect information about the 
person’s age, email address, phone number 
and postal code; the device’s location, unique 
device identifiers, mobile IP address and 
operating system; and the types of browsers 
used on the mobile device.
A troubling discovery is that only 16 
of the 50 apps indicate that the user’s data 
will be made anonymous, encrypted and 
secured and will be transmitted online 
and reported only in an aggregated 
format. Our data represent a number of 
government-issued COVID-19 tracing 
apps that are from both developing 
countries and developed countries. 
Somewhat worryingly, 20 apps from our 
sample were issued by governments, 
health ministries and other such official 
sources. While the US government is not 
currently requiring citizens to download 
any tracking apps, there are apps in the Play 
Store that were developed by US healthcare 
providers (Sentinel Healthcare, 98point6 
and HealthLynked) that have similar 
functionalities. What is not clear is whether 
any of the data collected are protected by 
any laws or regulations such as the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
or electronic protected health information.
It is, therefore, no surprise that Albert 
Fox Cahn, Executive Director of the 
Surveillance Technology Oversight Project 
(https://www.stopspying.org/), a nonprofit 
organization in Manhattan, New York, said 
“We could so easily end up in a situation 
where we empower local, state or federal 
government to take measures in response 
to this pandemic that fundamentally 
change the scope of American civil rights”3. 
What is disconcerting is that these apps 
are continuously collecting and processing 
highly sensitive personally identifiable 
information, such as health information, 
location and direct identifiers (e.g., name, 
age, email address, and voter/national 
identification). Governments’ use of such 
tracking technology — and the possibilities 
for how they might use it after the pandemic 
— is chilling to many. Notably, surveillance 
mapping through apps is allowing 
governments to identify people’s travel paths 
and their entire social networks4.
The European Data Protection Board 
issued a statement on the importance of 
protecting personal data while fighting 
COVID-195 and flagged articles of the 
General Data Protection Regulation that 
provide the legal grounds for processing 
personal data in the context of epidemics5. 
In the USA, however, there is no structured 
or legal privacy framework in place. The 
only federal agency that oversees digital 
privacy protections is the Federal Trade 
Commission, which addresses mainly 
inconsistent privacy policies from the point 
of view of consumer protection.
In recent weeks, US President Donald 
Trump assembled representatives from a 
number of digital-technology companies 
to formulate how mobile location data 
could be used to track citizens to address 
the pandemic in the USA6. In parallel, 
privacy and security researchers are working 
tirelessly to propose protection mechanisms 
that may be useful. For example, a recent 
publication by Harvard University’s Center 
for Ethics identifies tracing protocols that 
mitigate privacy risks and promotes the 
use of critical security and privacy controls 
that can accelerate medical responses while 
maintaining people’s rights7. Another group 
of researchers has proposed a system for 
secure and privacy-preserving proximity 
tracing at large scales through the application 
of anonymous identifiers and functional 
requirements of fundamental security and 
privacy, such as data minimization and 
retention8. Other emergency publications 
have suggested anonymization with random 
‘noise’9, artificial intelligence–generated 
‘noise’ or additively homomorphic 
encryption and message-based methods10 to 
generalize people’s data while being able to 
protect users’ privacy.
Healthcare providers must absolutely use 
whatever means are available to save lives 
and confine the spread of the virus. But 
it is up to the rest, especially those in the 
field of information privacy and security, 
to ask the questions needed to protect the 
right to privacy. However, it is important 
to note that there may be no choice but 
to adopt such mass surveillance measures 
if this pandemic does not go away or if 
another one comes into existence. Thus, it is 
crucial to ensure that policies, mathematical 
models and technological measures are 
developed to protect the data that are being 
collected and used, and transparency must 
be promoted in how data can help contain 
the spread while ensuring that civil liberties 
will still be protected. ❐
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